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Informal Social Networking and 
Community Involvement : 
Participation in Neighborhood 
Crime Watches in Japan 
Sean Richey 
University of Tokyo 
The inclusion of social recreational activities in meas-
ures of social capital is often criticized for trivializing 
civic engagement. This critique, however , ignores a key 
aspect of social capital theory, the interconnectedness of 
civil society. I examine the influence of informal social 
recreation on formal community involvement. I test the 
impact of social recreation on the likelihood of joining a 
Japanese neighborhood crime watch, while controlling 
for other determinants of participation. I use a logistic 
regression model of 2000 International Crime Victim 
Survey data . The results verify that social recreation mo-
tivates people to join crime watches, suggesting that in-
formal social interaction leads to broader civic 
engagement. 
Does social recreation lead to more formal community in-volvement? Critics complain that Putnam's (1993, 2000) inclusion of recreational activities in studies of social 
capital trivializes civil society. For example, Gannett (2003, 2) 
posits that using social events such as backyard barbecues as 
evidence of civic engagement blurs our understanding of partici-
pation in more important "political" community involvement. 
Putnam (2000, 119) suggests that social networks motivate com-
munity involvement by facilitating discussion, engendering trust, 
and instigating norms that lead to participation. For example, a 
backyard barbecue may enable a discussion of problems in the 
local schoo l system that leads to involvement in more "political" 
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volunteer associations such as the PTA. Critics view thi theory 
as conceptua lly ambiguous due to a perceived confusion of the 
social with the political, and dismiss the influence of informal 
socializing on formal community involvement (see Edwards 
2004). Empirical evidence is needed to resolve the debate. 
To examine the relationship between civic involvement and 
social interaction, I test the impact of informal socializing on 
individuals joining neighborhood crime watches, while control-
ling for fear of crime, prior crime victimhood, police compe-
tence, and socioeconomic detem1inants of participation. Crime 
watches are chosen as the dependent variable because joining 
with neighbors to prevent crime is a clear example of formal 
communal involvement that these critics say is a better measure 
of civil society. I test the theory by using a logistic regression 
model of International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) data from 
Japan. I choose Japan because neighborhood solutions to crime 
are common and used throughout the country (Thornton 1992). 
Japan is an excellent place to test the relationship between socia l 
and civic interaction because crime watches are available for all 
survey respondents to join. The United States, for example, is a 
less optimal country to test because crime watch usage is limited 
and regional (Thornton 1992). Limited usage biases the results 
from the ICVS national sample since joining is not an option for 
some respondents. I find that social recreation motivates people 
to join neighborhood watches, suggesting that Putnam is correct 
in asserting that informal social interaction leads to broader civic 
engagement. 
Although many recent studies show the benefits of civic en-
gagement on communities and participating individuals, the so-
cial mechanisms that cause collective action have not received 
the attention they deserve (Ostrom 1998). Before we can pro-
mote civil society, we first must know what causes people to par-
ticipate. Social capital scholars study activities that facilitate or 
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hinder one's opportunities to join. For example, Putnam (2000, 
235) shows that television viewing limits joining voluntary asso-
ciations or even family picnics. He posits that America's recent 
civic disengagement is caused by the dominance of television, 
which lowered civic association membership. Involvement in 
choral societies, soccer clubs, and bowling leagues are not end-
goals. Instead, social capital theorists desire the communal bene-
fits created by membership in these associations. Putnam (2000) 
shows that aggregate participation is higher in regions with 
dense social networks. He suggests that interaction in face-to-
face activities sponsors other community involvement. 
Critics complain that there is no relevance to democracy from 
studying involvement in trifling informal recreational activities 
(Edwards 2004). Edwards (2004) doubts that informal socializ-
ing influences participation in formal community activities. 
However, the face-to-face interaction that Edwards finds benefi-
cial in formal associations also occurs in informal human rela-
tions. Using Edward's logic, backyard barbecues should increase 
civic engagement as well. Gannett shows that Putnam's chief 
influence, Tocqueville, differentiated between formal civil and 
political associations-which are crucial for democracy-and 
social recreation. Tocqueville thought that recreation may "allow 
residents to 'taste the enjoyments of private life"' (Gannett 2003, 
2), but is not important for politics. Gannett states "we simply 
cannot equate family picnics with various types of political en-
gagement if we are to make our democracy work" (Gannett 
2003, 2). These critics, however, do not test empirically a key 
concept of Putnam's theory, that social recreation increases par-
ticipation in formal civil society. If you want to increase commu-
nity involvement, and social recreation increases involvement, 
then informal networks are "political" and must be studied. 
Other correlates of participation must be controlled to deter-
mine the relationship between social and civic orientation. For 
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example , people may join because they derive direct benefits 
from group membership (Olson 1990), i.e. instrumental reasons. 
They may also have a belief or emotional attachment to an is ue 
that does not profit them directly, but still motivates them to join, 
i.e. personal reasons. Although these reasons are not mutually 
exclusive, measuring which is the most powerful motivating 
force can help focus programs that facilitate civil society. 
THE POLICY AND THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
The results of my research have important policy and theo-
retical implications . For policymakers, the research is important 
because many reformers suggest the need for programs to en-
courage civil society. Detem1ining the causes of participation 
will provide reformers empirical evidence to improve their pro-
grams. If human interaction mobilizes participation, then these 
programs should focus on deepening their participants ' social 
networks . If, however, people join because of incentives or per-
sonal reasons, then these programs can attenuate these aspects. 
At this time, experiments to promote Japanese civil society are 
being conducted with incentive programs such as community 
currencies, and programs that focus on the specific interests of 
townspeople. In studying neighborhood watch involvement, my 
research provides a model to enhance programs . 
Theorists frequently debate the importance of institutions to 
civil society (e.g. Edwards and Foley 2001, and Edwards 2004). 
The research presented here provides a test of the debate. Jack-
man and Mi11er (1998) describe an internal inconsistency within 
scholarship as to whether civic engagement is endogenous or 
exogenous of institutions. They prefer James Coleman's (1990) 
endogenous research approach. Putnam 's work has grown from 
an early (1993, 18) thesis that posited an exogenous-only 'bot-
tom-up" relationship from civic culture to institutions, to a later 
stance (2000, 413) in which institutions can promote civil soci-
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ety. My research tests these assumptions . If informal social net-
works promote joining watches, then civic engagement is created 
by recreational activity, and institutional participation is not the 
only determinant of civil society. 
I find that informal social networks in Japan promote volun-
teering for crime watches, showing that civic engagement can be 
developed exogenously of institutions. Jackman and Miller 's 
( 1998) endogenous-only approach misses the important inter-
connectedness of communal life. Of course, participation in in-
stitutions may also increase one's civic engagement. Thus, 
influences of participation in civil society are possibly both en-
dogenous and exogenous of institutions. The research proceeds 
as follows: after reviewing the hypotheses and data, I determine 
the influence of everyday casual interaction--defined as "infor-
mal social networks "-on civic organizational involvement-
defined as "formal social networks." 
JAPANESE NEIG HBORHOOD WATCH PARTlCIPAT ION AND 
CRIME PREVENT ION 
Japan has low levels of social disorganization (Roberts and 
Lafree 2004). Social disorganization and social capital are simi-
lar concepts, in that both maintain that deep social networks 
bring collective good. A large body of literature suggests that the 
high level of social capital--or low level of social disorganiza-
tion- is responsible for Japan's low crime rates (Clifford 1976, 
Vogel 1979, Braithwaite 1989, Bayley 1991, Westermann and 
Burfeind 1991, Komiya 1999, Roberts and Lafree 2004). Japan 
is thought to have a communal culture, and these societal ties are 
linked to crime prevention (Becker 1988, Fujimoto 1994, 
MacFarlane 1995, Komiya 1999, Roberts and Lafree 2004). 
Shame and a desire not to hurt one's group are suggested as lim-
iting levels of deviant behavior (Thornton 1992, Roberts and 
Lafree 2004) . Others scholars disagree with these cultural expla-
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nations of Japan's lower relative crime rates. For example, Rob-
erts and Lafree (2004) use time series analysis of aggregate data 
to sh9w that Japan's high employment and relatively low leve ls 
of young males in the population (who commit most crime) ac-
count for its lower comparative crime rates . These socio-cu ltura l 
theories of Japan's low crime rates, however, do not explain why 
only some people join neighborhood watches, even after contro l-
ling for fear of crime, urbanity, prior victimization, police m-
competence, and other soc10econom1c determinants of 
participation. 
DATA 
To test these assumptions, I use ICVS data, which is spon-
sored by the United Nations Inten·egional Crime and Justice Re-
search Institute. In Japan, Koichi Hamai of the Ministry of 
Justice coordinates the survey nationally. The ICVS is performe d 
every four years, and I test data from the latest version conducte d 
in 2000. The survey has a sample of 2,500 and a response rate of 
88%. Neighborhood is a dichotomous dependent variable meas-
uring whether someone joined a crime watch coded "I" if par-
ticipating and "0" if not. The key causal independent variable is 
from a question that asks "[h]ow often do you personally go out 
in the evening for recreational purposes?" Social involvement is 
coded from no social recreational activity ("0"), once a year 
("I"), once a month ("2"), once a week ("3 "), and almost every 
day activity ("4"). Past crime victimization is measured as Victim 
and Violent, both are coded "I" if a victim in the last five years, 
and "0" if not. 1 Fear may motivate someone to join a crime pre-
vention program (Lewis and Salem 1986), and it is coded from 
1 Victim is combined from various !CVS questions on different types of crime victimi-
zation, including assault, robbery, rape, attempted murder , and corruption . See Table I 
for !CVS variable numbers . 
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no fear ("I"), little fear ("2"), some fear ("3"), and much fear 
("4"). Neighborhood watch participation might also come from a 
lack of adequate policing. How someone feels about Police com-
petence is coded from very good ("I"), somewhat good ("2"), 
somewhat poor ("3"), to very poor ("4"). 
Socioeconomic factors affect the opportunities to join , and 
unless controlled can bias the results. Along with political 
knowledge, education may cause a person to become rhetorically 
skillful and willing to participate (Freitag 2003). Education is 
measured in years of schooling. The elderly volunteer more of-
ten, and have longer ties to their community (Freitag 2003), so I 
control for Age measured in ascending five-year categories start-
ing from eighteen. Having a job may limit the time to participate , 
so I include Employment, coded dichotomously with " 1" being 
jobholders and "0" for the unemployed. Women are more com-
munally active (LeBlanc 1999); here Female equals "1" and 
male is coded "0." Rural areas have a more reciprocal communal 
life than urban areas (Putnam 2000, 96), so I include Urban, 
coded ordinally based on town size; ranging from "1" for towns 
with a population under 10,000 to "6" those with populations 
over 2,000,000 . Singles may have fewer time constraints, and 
thus participation may be easier for them than for married cou-
ples (Freitag 2003); Married is a dichotomous variable with " I" 
being those married, and "0" those single. Importantly, no con-
trol variables are post-treatment, i.e. caused by watch participa-
tion. 
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The data include 1,350 complete cases, out of 2,211. Error 
occurs when missing data are not missing completely at random 
(King et al. 2001 ). Table 1 lists the number of responses for each 
variable. Many of the cases are missing only one variable's re-
sponse, but regression analysis using listwise deletion throws out 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE ST A TlSTICS 
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max N 
eighborhood Watch 0.14 0.349 0 1 2189 
Social 1.40 1.116 0 4 2211 
Fear 2.13 0.639 1 4 2210 
Victim 0.41 0.492 0 1 2211 
Violent 0.03 0.173 0 1 2211 
Police 2.35 0.702 I 4 1844 
Urban 3.37 1.500 1 6 1687 
Age 7.46 3.222 1 12 2211 
Education 12.05 2.715 7 18 2079 
Employment 0.62 0.483 0 1 2211 
Female 0.51 0.500 0 I 2211 
These are the average descriptive statistics of the multiple imputed data sets. To repli-
cate, use 2000 Japan !CVS variables numbers Social S0060, Fear S0020, Victim 
C0IA00, 02A000, C03A000, CO4A000, C0SA000, C06A000, C07A000, C0Si\000. 
C09A000, CI0A000, Cl IA000, Cl2A000, C13A0OO, Cl4Al00, Cl IA000, 
C 12A000; Violent C 11 A000, CI 2A000; Police P00 IO I, Urban D0020, Married 
D0090, Age D0010, Educ. D0063, Employ. D0050, Gell{/er K040. "N"· is the number 
of cases before multiple imputation. 
the entire case. Multiple imputation is a better alternative than 
listwise deletion (King et al. 2001). Multiple imputation creates 
data for the missing responses based on information in the case 
and the other data. Simulated data are more trustworthy than data 
biased by listwise deletion (King et al. 2001 ). I use the Amelia 
(King et al. 2001) program to create five imputed data sets, and 
each with 2211 cases. I use the Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg, and 
King 2003) package from Stata to handle the multiple data sets, 
run the regressions, calculate the standard errors, and create the 
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simulations below. To determine if the imputation is biasing the 
results, I show the outcomes from two models (see Table 2). One 
model uses the original complete case data, and one uses the 
multiple imputation data sets. 
METHODS 
To determine the impact of social networks on a dependent 
variable, many researchers perform a multiple regress ion analy-
sis of survey data with social networks as the causal variable. 
while controlling for other determinants, such as soc10-
economics. I take the same approach with this research. 
Neighborhood is a dichotomous dependent variable, so I create a 
logistic model, which is appropriate for binary outcomes (Long 
1997). The model is estimated as 
Y =a+/J *X +/3 *X +/J *X +/J *X Nl•1ghhorhood 1 Sot'ial 1 Fear 3 J 'irtim 4 f'ohcc 
+ /Js * X UrlHm +/J o* x \/urric,I + /31* XA gc +/JR* X E,,,,, + /Jq * x,,,,,,,,.., 
+ /J10 * X Gcmlcr +£ 
Also, I present below the results from Clarifj• (Tomz , Witten-
berg, and King 2003), which creates simulations drawn from the 
data to show a quantity of interest. Clarify :S autho rs King, Ton12, 
and Wittenberg (2000) describe its process thusly: "[t]he pro-
gram draws simulations of the main and anci llary parameters 
from their asymptotic sampling distribution, in most cases a mul-
tivariate nom1al with mean equal to the vector of parameter es-
timates and variance equal to the variance-covariance matrix of 
estimates." Here, all the other control variables are held at their 
mean, and the expected probability of participating in a watch 1s 
shown for each level of socializing . 
Violent crime victims may have different leve ls of per onal 
satisfaction from stoppmg crime than less serious crime victims, 
and both are included in the Victim variable. To detem1me i r 
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there is a difference, I create a separate Violent variable to meas-
ure only those who have suffered violent crime. I create a Re-
ceiver Operator Characteristic (ROC) plot of the two models-
all crime victims and just violent crime victims-to compare 
these specifications (see King and Zeng 2002 for more on ROC 
plots) . 
In addition, I check against endogeneity between the depend-
ent and causal variables because through joining a crime watch 
people may meet friends that they socialize with afterwards. 
Thus, the level of informal socialization may come from civic 
engagement. I examine the potential bi-casual relationship using 
an Amemiya Generalized Least Squares (AGLS) model. If the 
dependent variable is continuous, I can use the familiar two-
stage least squares estimator to determine the impact of endoge-
neity. Here, I use "ivprob" command for Stata to control for en-
dogeneity in a model with a dichotomous dependent variab!e.2 
RESULTS 
Goodness of Fit 
The ROC plot displayed in Figure l shows that there is no 
significant difference between modeling all and violent crime 
victims on participation in neighborhood watches. Simply put, 
the results show that violent crime victimization does not influ-
ence joining rates anymore than other types of crime. In addition, 
the test shows that the model is successfully predicting a high 
percentage of the binary outcomes, as the lines are significantly 
above the forty-five degree line ofrandom chance. 
2 For details of AGLS estimation see Maddalla (I 983, 247-252), and Newey (I 987, eq. 
5.6). 
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FIGURE 1 
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Lines represent how well the logistic model does in 
predicting neighborhood watch participation . The 
closer the lines are to the upper right comer, the 
bett er the model (King and Zeng 2002). The model 
with violent crime victims is in dashes , the model 
with all crime victims in solid. 
LOGISTIC MODEL RESULTS 
The results displayed in Table 2 show that a chief rea son peo-
ple join crime watches is social networking. The data suggests 
that the more informal social interaction you have , the more 
likely you are to participate in your community. Social recreation 
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TABLE 2 
LOGISTIC MODEL RESULTS FOR 
PARTICIPATION IN NEIGHBORHOOD WATCHES 
Variable ME MISE cc CCSE 
Social .154t .062 .220-r .076 
Fear .161 .103 .068 .125 
Victim .154 .130 .169 .157 
Police -.094 .094 -.044 .118 
Urban -.224t .044 -.212t .054 
Married -.188 .146 -.290 .182 
Age .095t .025 .077t .033 
Education .038 .027 .014 .032 
Employment .053 .141 -.019 .189 
Female .397t .135 .433t .167 
Constant -3.160 .609 -2.54Jt .795 
Number of cases 2,211 1,350 
Pseudo R2 0.03 0.03 
xi 55.60! 36.7l t 
MI rows represe nt the average unsta ndardized coefficients and standard errors of a 
logis tic model for the likeli hood of joi ning a crime watc h from each imputed data set 
calcu lated wi th Clarify. CC rows represent the unstandard ized coefficients and stan-
dard errors of a logistic mode l for the like lihood of joi ning a crime watch from the 
orig inal complete case data set. t p < .0 I t p < .00 I. 
activity levels have a strong positive significant impact (.154) on 
neighborhood watch participation, when holding all other vari-
ables constant. Crime victimization is not significant, suggesting 
that personal reasons for joining neighborhood watches are not 
motivating behavior. Fear of crime does not increase participa-
tion in these groups, suggesting that desired benefits (i.e. less 
crime) do not influence behavior even when people believe there 
is a problem. The police competence measure is also not signifi-
cant; showing that institutional failure to provide adequate polic-
ing does not affect participation . Note that many (35%) in the 
study think their police are incompetent. The other significant 
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variables match their theoretical predictions . Age increases par-
ticipation . Women have more involvement , and so do those in 
rural areas. Note that the multiple imputation model and the 
complete cases model show substantively similar results for 
every variable and the constant. 
PROBABILITIES OF NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH PARTICIPATION 
The results of the Clarify simulation displayed in Figure 2 
show that when holding all other variables at their mean , those 
.,, 
N 
FIGURE 2 
Simulated Probab1ht1es of the Impact of Social Recreabon Acbvity 
Once Week Almost Everyday 
Never Once a Year Once A Month 
Level of Social ActMty 
Graph boxes represent the results of a logistic simulation 
created by Clarify (Tomz, Wittenberg , and King 2003) . 
These simulations hold all control variables (victimization, 
fear of crime, police competence, and socioeconomic vari-
ables) at their means and display the predicted value and 
95% confidence intervals for the dependent variable 
(neighborhood watch participation) for each level of the 
causal variable (social activity). 
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who are most actively involved with social networks are about 
twice as likely to join their neighbors to fight crime as those who 
are not socially active. In Japan, about 11 % of those with no so-
cial activity are predicted to join, while about 19% of those with 
the densest social networks join after controlling for Victim, 
Fear, Police, and socioeconomic detem1inants of participation. 
Those with almost every day social activities have a 95% confi-
dence interval lowest bound (.14) that is above the highest bound 
(.13) for those with no social activities. Thus, social recreational 
activity increases the likelihood of community involvement as 
measured by neighborhood watch participation. Thus, Putnam's 
theory is verified by these results. 
AGLS Regression Model 
For the AGLS model, I use Education as an instrument. Many 
studies show that education increases social networking ( e.g. 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, Putnam 2001). Surprisingly, how-
ever, education does not influence joining crime watches, as 
shown in Table 2. Thus , this is a counter-intuitive instrument, but 
it still may control for bi-causality. Indeed, I find that Education 
is significantly correlated with Social (b 0.08, s.e. 0.01 ), but not 
Neighborhood watch (b 0.038, s.e. 0.027). Sensitivity analysis 
revealed that taking Education out of the model had no discern-
able effect on Social. In the AGLS model, socialization strongly 
positively influences the likelihood of joining a crime watch (b 
0 .530, s.e. 0.409). The large standard error for Social is probably 
due to imprecision in the instrument. Thus, we must be cautious 
in interpreting this model, but the results suggest that there is no 
bi-causal relationship . The AGLS results show similar effects for 
all other variables. The robustness of the results suggests that 
involvement does not influence the amount of socializing. 
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TABLE 3 
AGLS MODEL RESULTS FOR 
PARTICIPATION I NEIGHBORHOOD WATCHES 
Variab le Coef. S.E. 
Social 0.530 (0.409) 
Crime 0.042 (0.092) 
Fear -0.108 (0.059) 
Police -0.123* (0.057) 
Female 0.404* (0.179) 
Age 0.083* (0.038) 
Urban -0.104! (0.024) 
Employment 00.149 (0. I 93) 
Marital 0.078 (0.172) 
Constant -3.253* ( 1.599) 
Number of cases 2,211 
Pseudo R2 0.03 
x 2 47 .20! 
Cells represent the average unstandardized coeflicients and standard e1Tors of a 
AGLS model for the likelihood of joining a crime watch from of each imputed 
data set. Er/11c111ion is the instrument variable. *p < .05 t p < .0 I t p < .00 I 
CONCLUS ION 
I find that recreational activity encourages people to JOIO 
crime watches in Japan. The results show that informal social 
networking leads to participation in other areas. We cannot ig-
nore the benefits to civil society from institution-exogenous in-
formal social recreation. Critics of the inclusion of recreational 
activities in civil society measures should not dismiss their influ-
ence on traditional political participation. The research approach 
advocated by Gannett (2003), Edwards (2004) , Edwards and 
Foley (2004) and Miller and Jackman (1998) ignores the impact 
of social interaction on institutional involvement. Both formal 
and informal interaction must be measured and considered to 
detennine the full scope of civil society. These critics encourage 
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a focus only on the institution-endogenous determinants of civil 
society. Ignoring real-world complications in a quest for clarity 
only further confuses our understanding of the multifaceted rela-
tionships we are studying. Additionally , the results reported here 
suggest that although motivating involvement may be crucial to 
stopping crime, incentive or specialized interest programs will 
not motivate joiners. Increa sing the density of social connecte d-
ness is where reformers should focus their energies . The results 
show that informal networks increase communal participation to 
reduce crime , suggesting other types of communal involvement 
will be influenced in a similar relationship. 
Some caution, however, is needed in interpreting these re-
sults. The ability to examine this test is limited to the validity of 
the survey data , question wording, and methodology (Zaller 
1992). This is particularly true when only examining one survey 
as I did here . In addition, there are no questions of social psy -
chology in the !CVS data , so possible determinants such as trust, 
tolerance , and efficacy cannot be included in the model. Finally, 
the inability to find a more precise instrument variable leaves 
open the question of bi-causality . Despite these limitations, the 
research provides some evidence of the positive impact of social 
recreation on civic life. 
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